Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Toro, Francisco P.
Author-Email: toro@merit.unu.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: UNU-MERIT
Title: Agenda Disputes and Strategic Venue Preferences: The Doha Crisis and Europe’s 
	 Flight to Regionalism 
Abstract: Agenda-setting disputes have become increasingly central to the conduct 
	 of multilateral trade negotiations. Introducing some simple concepts 
	 from Negotiations Theory, we focus on the dynamic interplay between the 
	 Doha Round’s agenda setting and bargaining stages, underlining their 
	 implications for the European Union’s evolving win-set in the 
	 negotiations. We argue that, by successful enshrining a narrow agenda, 
	 key developing countries reduced the set of possible final settlements 
	 that were both multilaterally viable and attractive from the point of 
	 view of key European interests. In an attempt to avoid imposing 
	 concentrated costs on those interests, the European Commission has 
	 responded by pursuing its best alternative to a multilateral agreement, 
	 shifting negotiating resources away from the multilateral table and 
	 towards regional FTA negotiations.
Classification-JEL: F13 
Keywords: Trade Policy-making, Doha Round, EU, sectoral lobbying, trade 
	 negotiations
Series: UNU-MERIT Working Papers
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 2008-048
File-URL: https://unu-merit.nl/publications/wppdf/2008/wp2008-048.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 275 Kb
Handle: RePEc:unm:unumer:2008048