Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Damianov, D.
Author-Name: Peeters, R.J.A.P.
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics
Title: The lowest-bid all-pay-auction as a fundraising mechanism: theoretically optimal but behaviorally fragile
Series: METEOR Research Memorandum
Creation-Date: 20120101
Number: 050
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/676827/guid-e1bc3b7e-9396-4e15-81c2-0cd08fda07ef-ASSET1.0.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 399249
Handle: Repec:unm:umamet:2012050
DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2012050