Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Csóka, P.
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics
Author-Name: Herings, P.J.J.
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics
Author-Name: Kóczy, L.Á.
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics
Author-Name: Pintér, M.
Title: Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility
Abstract: We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility<br/>(NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and<br/>marginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of ∏-balanced, totally ∏-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex
Classification-JEL: c71
Series: METEOR Research Memorandum
Creation-Date: 20090101
Number: 031
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/51480235/RM09031.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 363633
Handle: Repec:unm:umamet:2009031
DOI: 10.26481/umamet/2009031