Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Atlamaz, M.
Author-Name: Berden, C.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Author-Name: Peters, H.J.M.
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE ETBC, Quantitative Economics
Author-Name: Vermeulen, A.J.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC
Title: Non-Cooperative Solutions for Claims Problems
Abstract: In a claims problem an estate has to be divided among several claimants whose total claim exceeds the size of the estate. This paper extends the<br/>noncooperative approach, initiated by O’Neill (1982), by allowing players to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering<br/>the case where individual claims may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria is obtained both for restricted claims<br/>problems, where individual claims do not exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result<br/>in proportional division in equilibrium.<br/>
Series: METEOR Research Memorandum
Creation-Date: 20080101
Number: 038
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/49675201/RM08038.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 271463
Handle: Repec:unm:umamet:2008038
DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2008038