Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dietzenbacher, Bas
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Hanssen, Pauline
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Tamura, Yuki
Title: Egalitarian reallocation when preferences are single-peaked
Abstract: This paper studies egalitarian reallocation when preferences are single-peaked and<br/>each agent is endowed with a share of one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-<br/>disposable commodity. We focus on the distributional criteria Lorenz domination and variance domination. We show that a new rule, the egalitarian uniform rule, is the unique Pareto optimal and individually rational rule that Lorenz dominates and variance dominates all other rules satisfying these properties.
Keywords: resource reallocation, single-peaked preferences, egalitarianism
Classification-JEL: d63,d71,d74
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20261102
Number: 014
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/326393556/RM26014.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 494610
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2026014
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026014