Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Hanssen, Pauline
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Dietzenbacher, Bas
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Title: Envy-free reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
Abstract: This paper studies reallocation problems where preferences are single-dipped and each agent is endowed with a share of one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. We focus on several envy-freeness requirements: standard envy-freeness, restricted envy-freeness, net trade envy-freeness, and proportional envy-freeness. It turns out that none of these envy freeness requirements is compatible with Pareto optimality for each reallocation problem. However, for standard envy-freeness, net trade envy-freeness, and proportional envy-freeness, at most one allocation is Pareto optimal. For restricted envy-freeness, at most one allocation is Pareto optimal and individually rational. For each of the four envy-freeness requirements, we characterize this unique allocation for each reallocation problem where it exists.
Keywords: resource reallocation, single-dipped preferences, Envy-freeness
Classification-JEL: d63,d71
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20260903
Number: 007
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/322675802/RM26007.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 464942
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2026007
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026007