Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dietzenbacher, Bas
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Hanssen, Pauline
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Tamura, Yuki
Title: Core selection with single-peaked preferences and endowment ownership
Abstract: This paper studies reallocation problems where preferences are single-peaked and one agent is endowed with one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. We characterize all allocations that belong to the core, i.e. no group of agents is better off by reallocating among themselves. Under excess supply, we show that all rules satisfying Pareto optimality and individual rationality select from the strong core. Under excess demand, we show that all rules satisfying Pareto optimality, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness select from the weak core, but there is no strategy-proof rule that selects from the strong core.
Keywords: resource reallocation, single-peaked preferences, weak core, strong core
Classification-JEL: d63,d71,d74
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20260608
Number: 005
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/314185574/RM26005.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 465877
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2026005
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026005