Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dietzenbacher, Bas
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Dogan, Emre
Title: Population monotonicity and egalitarianism
Abstract: This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which population<br/>monotonicity (no player is worse off when additional players enter the game) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible, which is the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme. On this domain, which strictly includes the class of convex games, population monotonicity and egalitarian core selection together characterize the Dutta-Ray solution. We relate the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme to several other classes of games.
Classification-JEL: c71
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20240502
Number: 007
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/194209657/RM24007.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 632324
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2024007
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2024007