Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Triêu, Anh
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Bos, Iwan
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, Organisation,Strategy & Entrepreneurship
Author-Name: Schröder, Marc
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Vermeulen, Dries
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: FSE DACS Mathematics Centre Maastricht
Title: Maximal matchings
Abstract: There are many situations in which policymakers are primarily concerned with the availability and accessibility of goods or services. Examples include electricity, food, housing, medical supplies, et cetera. In such cases, the social goal may be to maximize the number of transactions, which we refer to as a maximal matching. This paper presents a mechanism that implements this objective. The mechanism satisfies the incentive and participation constraints, but requires external funding.
Classification-JEL: c72,d47,d63
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20240411
Number: 004
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/190274451/RM24004.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 659596
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2024004
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2024004