Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dietzenbacher, Bas
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Tamura, Yuki
Title: Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
Abstract: One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.
Classification-JEL: d63,d71
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20230619
Number: 009
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/140986183/RM23009.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 598066
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2023009
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2023009