Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Gong, Doudou
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, Quantitative Economics
Author-Name: Dietzenbacher, Bas
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Peters, Hans
Author-workplace-name: RS: FSE DKE Mathematics Centre Maastricht, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Title: Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences
Abstract: A mechanism allocates one unit of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents reporting a number between zero and one. Nash, Pareto optimal Nash, and strong equilibria are analyzed for the case where the agents have single-dipped preferences. One of the main results is that when the mechanism is anonymous, monotonic, standard, and order preserving, then the Pareto optimal Nash and strong equilibria coincide and assign Pareto optimal allocations that are characterized by so-called maximal coalitions: members of a maximal coalition prefer an equal coalition share over obtaining zero, whereas the outside agents prefer zero over obtaining an equal share from joining the coalition.
Classification-JEL: c72,d71
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20220718
Number: 007
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/97759787/RM22007.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 486097
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2022007
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2022007