Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Storcken, Ton
Author-workplace-name: RS: FSE DKE Mathematics Centre Maastricht, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Title: Tournaments as collective decisions
Abstract: Unless all tournaments are admissible as individual preferences, we show<br/>that, structure diversity of the range of a Pareto-optimal, neutral,<br/>non-dictatorial, and independent of irrelevant alternatives preference rules<br/>is greater than the structure diversity in the individual preferences upon<br/>which these preference rules are based.
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20210930
Number: 015
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/73075574/RM21015.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 390996
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2021015
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2021015