Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Storcken, Ton Author-workplace-name: RS: FSE DKE Mathematics Centre Maastricht, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory Title: Restricted domains with Pareto free pairs Abstract: Among the domains restricted by Pareto free pairs we determine those allowing for preference rules being anonymous and independent of irrelevant alternatives. Essentially such preference rules appear to be based on a priority ordered at which adjacent alternatives can only be swapped in order is all agents agree with this swap. Classification-JEL: d71,d79 Series: GSBE Research Memoranda Creation-Date: 20210916 Number: 012 File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/72764080/RM21012.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 376402 Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2021012 DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2021012