Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Kerman, Toygar Author-workplace-name: General Economics 0 (Onderwijs), RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research Author-Name: Tenev, Anastas P. Author-workplace-name: General Economics 0 (Onderwijs), RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation Title: Persuading communicating voters Abstract: This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with receivers who have homogeneous beliefs and aligned preferences. The sender wants to implement a proposal and commits to a communication strategy which sends private (possibly) correlated messages to the receivers, who are in an exogenous and commonly known network. Receivers can observe their neighbors’ private messages and after updating their beliefs, vote sincerely on the proposal. We examine how networks of shared information affect the sender’s gain from persuasion and find that in many cases it is not restricted by the additional information provided by the receivers’ neighborhoods. Perhaps surprisingly, the sender’s gain
from persuasion is not monotonically decreasing with the density of the network. Classification-JEL: c72,d72,d82,d85 Series: GSBE Research Memoranda Creation-Date: 20210101 Number: 003 File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/61334968/RM21003.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 742343 Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2021003 DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2021003