Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE Theme Data-Driven Decision-Making, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, Microeconomics & Public Economics
Title: Expectational Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models with Contracts - A Reformulation of Competitive Equilibrium
Abstract: We introduce the notion of expectational equilibrium in a very general specification of the many-to-one matching with contracts model. The endogenous variables in an expectational equilibrium are expectations about tradable contracts. Expectational equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to stable outcomes. Substitutability of preferences is a sufficient condition for existence. Expectational equilibrium unifies all the other approaches used in the literature so far, in particular Walrasian equilibrium, Drèze equilibrium, and market clearing cutoffs. It also applies to cases where contracts do not involve money as well as cases where there is a smallest monetary unit of account.
Classification-JEL: c71,c78,d45,d51
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20200702
Number: 018
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/49274397/RM20018.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 707342
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2020018
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2020018