Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE Theme Data-Driven Decision-Making, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, Microeconomics & Public Economics
Author-Name: Kóczy, László Á. 
Title: The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games
Abstract: In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the most popular solutions. While it is a fundamentally static concept, the consideration of a sequential extension of the underlying dominance correspondence gave rise to a selection of non-empty generalizations. Among these, the payoff-equivalence minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set are defined by a similar set of conditions. We identify some problems with the payoff-equivalence minimal dominant set and propose an appropriate reformulation called the minimal dominant set. We show that replacing asymptotic external stability by sequential weak dominance leaves the myopic stable set unaffected. The myopic stable set is therefore equivalent to the minimal dominant set.
Classification-JEL: c71
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20200609
Number: 017
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/48643188/RM20017.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 611324
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2020017
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2020017