Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kerman, Toygar
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, Microeconomics & Public Economics
Author-Name: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE Theme Data-Driven Decision-Making, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, Microeconomics & Public Economics
Author-Name: Karos, Dominik
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, Microeconomics & Public Economics
Title: Persuading Strategic Voters
Abstract: A Sender wants to persuade multiple Receivers with homogeneous preferences and a common belief about the state of the world to vote in favor of a proposal. Prior to the vote Sender commits to a communication strategy which sends private, potentially correlated, signals to Receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. While Sender benefits from using private messages rather than public communication if Receivers vote sincerely, under the optimal communication strategy, sincere voting is not in any Receiver’s best interest. If the proposal does not require unanimous agreement, Sender’s optimal communication strategy after which sincere voting indeed constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is such that no voter is ever pivotal.
Classification-JEL: c72,d72,d82,d83
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20200220
Number: 004
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/39677264/RM20004.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 667874
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2020004
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2020004