Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Karos, Dominik
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE ETBC, Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation
Author-Name: Rachmilevitch, Shiran
Title: The Midpoint-Constrained Egalitarian Bargaining Solution
Abstract: A payoff allocation in a bargaining problem is midpoint dominant if each<br/>player obtains at least one n-th of her ideal payoff. The egalitarian solution of<br/>a bargaining problem may select a payoff configuration which is not midpoint<br/>dominant. We propose and characterize the solution which selects for each<br/>bargaining problem the feasible allocation that is closest to the egalitarian<br/>allocation, subject to being midpoint dominant. Our main axiom, midpoint<br/>monotonicity, is new to the literature; it imposes the standard monotonicity<br/>requirement whenever doing so does not result in selecting an allocation which<br/>is not midpoint dominant. In order to prove our main result we develop a<br/>general extension theorem for bargaining solutions that are order-preserving<br/>with respect to any order on the set of bargaining problems.
Classification-JEL: c71,c78,d61,d63
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20180329
Number: 007
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/25258008/RM18007.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 578470
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2018007
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018007