Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Anbarci, Nejat
Author-Name: Cingiz, Kutay
Author-workplace-name: General Economics 0 (Onderwijs), RS: GSBE ETBC
Author-Name: Ismail, Mehmet
Title: Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests
Abstract: In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied.
Classification-JEL: c73,d72
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20180208
Number: 003
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/24150745/RM18003.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 576267
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2018003
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018003