Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Demuynck, Thomas
Author-Name: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, RS: GSBE Theme Data-Driven Decision-Making
Author-Name: Saulle, Riccardo
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC
Author-Name: Seel, Christian
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation
Title: The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments (RM/17/002-revised)
Abstract: We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set (MSS). The MSS is defined for a general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. An MSS exists and, under minor continuity assumptions, it is also unique.<br/>The MSS generalizes and unifies various results from more specific applications. It coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games when this set is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the Gale-Shapley matching model; with the set of Pareto optimal allocations in the Shapley-Scarf housing matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in pseudo-potential games and finite supermodular games; and with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in several classes of two-player games.<br/>
Classification-JEL: c70,c71
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20180201
Number: 001
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/24028966/RM18001.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 783147
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2018001
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018001