Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Bozbay, Irem Author-Name: Peters, Hans Author-workplace-name: QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE ETBC Title: Information aggregation with continuum of types Abstract: We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in the form of types (signals). We assume that types are distributed from a state-dependent continuous distribution. In this model, Bayesian equilibrium voting and efficient voting coincide, and informative voting means that a voter votes in favor of the issue if and only if the signal exceeds a cut-point level. Our main result is an answer, in the form of a condition on the parameters of the model, to the question when informative voting is efficient.
Classification-JEL: c70,d70,d71,d80,d82 Series: GSBE Research Memoranda Creation-Date: 20171212 Number: 032 File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/17747500/RM17032.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 514568 Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2017032 DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017032