Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Bossert, Walter
Author-Name: Peters, Hans
Author-workplace-name: QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE ETBC
Title: Choice on the simplex domain
Abstract: One unit of a good has to be divided among a group N of individuals who each<br/>are entitled to a minimal share and these shares sum up to less than one. The associated set of choice problems consists of the unit simplex and all its full-dimensional subsimplices with the same orientation. We characterize all choice rules that are independent of irrelevant alternatives, continuous, and monotonic. The resulting rules are what we refer to as N-path choice functions. If there are only three individuals, the monotonicity property can be weakened. We also consider the issue of rationalizability and show that, for the threeagent<br/>case, excluding cycles of length three in the revealed preference relation implies the strong axiom of revealed preference, that is, the exclusion of cycles of any length.
Classification-JEL: d11,d71
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20171205
Number: 030
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/17620644/RM17030.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 419279
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2017030
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017030