Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kasper, Laura
Author-Name: Peters, Hans
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE ETBC, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Author-Name: Vermeulen, Dries
Author-workplace-name: RS: GSBE ETBC, QE Operations research
Title: Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
Abstract: We consider voting correspondences that are, besides<br/>Condorcet Consistent, immune against the two strong no show<br/>paradoxes. That is, it cannot happen that if an additional voter<br/>ranks a winning alternative on top then that alternative becomes<br/>loosing, and that if an additional voter ranks a loosing<br/>alternative at bottom then that alternative becomes winning. This<br/>immunity is called the Top Property in the first case and the<br/>Bottom Property in the second case. We establish the voting<br/>correspondence satisfying Condorcet Consistency and the Top<br/>Property, which is maximal in the following strong sense: it is the union of all smaller voting correspondences with these two properties. The result remains true if we add the Bottom Property but not if we replace the Top Property by the Bottom Property. This voting correspondence contains the Minimax Rule but it is<br/>strictly larger. In particular, voting functions (single-valued voting correspondences) that are Condorcet Consistent and immune against the two paradoxes must select from this maximal correspondence, and we demonstrate several ways in which this can or cannot be done.<br/>
Classification-JEL: d71,d72
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20170625
Number: 017
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/14366820/RM17017.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 405575
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2017017
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017017