Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Cingiz, Kutay
Author-workplace-name: General Economics 0 (Onderwijs), RS: GSBE ETBC
Author-Name: Flesch, Janos
Author-workplace-name: QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE ETBC
Author-Name: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC
Author-Name: Predtetchinski, Arkadi
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC
Title: Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once
Abstract: We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.
Classification-JEL: c72,c73,d91
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20160101
Number: 036
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/5676862/RM16036.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 528792
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2016036
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2016036