Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peeters, Ronald
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC
Author-Name: Tenev, Anastas
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC
Title: Number of bidders and the winner's curse
Abstract: The second-price sealed-bid common-value auction exhibits lower winner's curse probability compared to the rst-price auction for any number of bidders. For both auction types, above a certain threshold adding more bidders increases the chances of the winner's curse only marginally while it decreases potential losses to the bidders and increases revenue. Below this threshold, having fewer bidders lowers the winner's curse probability and the losses to the bidders, but also the average revenue.
Classification-JEL: d44,d82,h57
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20160101
Number: 031
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/5241861/RM16031.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 373831
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2016031
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2016031