Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peleg, B.
Author-Name: Peters, H.J.M.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Title: Feasible elimination procedures in social choice : an axiomatic characterization
Abstract: Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20160101
Number: 001
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/545600/guid-c334a3da-9891-4648-a8b7-c4161fd211db-ASSET1.0.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 337037
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2016001
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2016001