Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Heine, F.A.
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics
Author-Name: Strobel, M.
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics
Title: Reward and punishment in a team contest
Abstract: A team contest entails both public good situations within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other group members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two groups compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the team contest. Unlike what experimental studies in isolated public goods games indicate, we find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the group project. Furthermore, comparing treatment groups, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing. This is particularly pronounced for the between-group contest.
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20150101
Number: 034
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/544252/guid-12242441-1e28-44c5-ac6d-be67f451b5ff-ASSET1.0.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 803114
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2015034
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015034