Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Lahiri, A.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Author-Name: Peters, H.J.M.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Author-Name: Storcken, A.J.A.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Title: Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
Abstract: We consider the joint decision of placing public bads in each of two neighboring countries, modelled by two adjacent line segments. Residents of the two countries have single-dipped preferences, determined by the location of the nearest public bad to their dips. A social choice function or rule takes a profile of reported preferences as input and assigns the location of the public bad in each country. All rules satisfying strategy-proofness, country-specific Pareto optimality, non-corruptibility, and the far away condition are characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations.<br/>
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20150101
Number: 007
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1499107/guid-bcb17a8a-28a2-4c47-9424-8ba745aad3b7-ASSET1.0.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 352744
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2015007
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015007