Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Herings, P.J.J.
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics
Author-Name: Houba, H
Title: Costless delay in negotiations
Abstract: We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions are necessary for SSPE but insufficient because these equations can be singular. Strategy profiles excluding perpetual disagreement guarantee non-singularity. The necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of stationary best responses additionally require either an equalizing condition or a minimality condition. Quasi SSPE only satisfy the recursive equations and optimality conditions. These always exist and are SSPE if either all equalizing conditions or all minimality conditions hold.
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20150101
Number: 002
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1628348/guid-7c967717-a8ba-4c22-bebd-b59f9d892472-ASSET1.0.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 518708
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2015002
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015002