Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Can, B.
Author-workplace-name: Microeconomics & Public Economics
Title: Distance rationalizability of scoring rules
Abstract: Collective decision making problems can be seen as finding an outcome that is "closest" to a concept of "consensus". [1] introduced "Closeness to Unanimity Procedure" as a first example to this approach and showed that the Borda rule is the closest to unanimity under swap distance (a.k.a the [2] distance). [3] shows that the Dodgson rule is the closest to Condorcet under swap distance. [4, 5] generalized this concept as distance-rationalizability, where being close is measured via various distance functions and with many concepts of consensus, e.g., unanimity, Condorcet etc. In this paper, we show that all non-degenerate scoring rules can be distance-rationalized as "Closeness to Unanimity" procedures under a class of weighted distance functions introduced in [6]. Therefore, the results herein generalizes [1] and builds a connection between scoring rules and a generalization of the Kemeny distance, i.e. weighted distances.
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20130101
Number: 068
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1530618/guid-b4a7f598-9999-483d-bf7d-a7b720483710-ASSET1.0.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 313403
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2013068
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013068