Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peters, H.J.M.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Author-Name: Schröder, M.J.W.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Author-Name: Vermeulen, A.J.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Title: Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions
Abstract: We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information with respect to the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, <br/>i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies)<br/>for any preference profile.<br/>
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20130101
Number: 049
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1653561/guid-ce93c9e1-4553-47ca-b2ff-8d952b1217b2-ASSET1.0.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 312467
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2013049
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013049