Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Bossert, W.
Author-workplace-name: Externe publicaties SBE
Author-Name: Peters, H.J.M.
Author-workplace-name: Quantitative Economics
Title: Single-basined choice
Abstract: Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent.<br/>
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 20130101
Number: 030
File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1283505/guid-7e06f15f-8d5b-4a36-a182-25376f77a308-ASSET1.0.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 182738
Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2013030
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013030