Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Bos, A.M. Author-workplace-name: Organisation,Strategy & Entrepreneurship Author-Name: Harrington Jr., J.E. Title: Competition policy and cartel size Abstract: This paper examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy makes the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either increase or decrease their inclusiveness. Highly inelastic market demand is sufficient for the presence of a competition authority to cause the least inclusive stable cartels to increase in size.
Series: GSBE Research Memoranda Creation-Date: 20130101 Number: 027 File-URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1051005/guid-20cecf39-d575-4a70-8808-e24e189fb8f1-ASSET1.0.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 321524 Handle: Repec:unm:umagsb:2013027 DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013027