Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Herings P.J.J. 
Author-Name: Meshalkin A. 
Author-Name: Predtetchinski A. 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games
Abstract: We study strategies with one–period recall in the context of a general class of multilateralbargaining games. A strategy has one–period recall if actions in a particular period are onlyconditioned on information in the previous and the current period. We show that if players aresufficiently patient, given any proposal in the space of possible agreements, there exists asubgame perfect equilibrium such that the given proposal is made and unanimously accepted inperiod zero. Our strategies are pure and have one–period recall, and we do not make use of apublic randomization device. The players’ discount factors are allowed to be heterogeneous.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2012
Number: 056
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:edbe11b2-9997-4ddd-a078-6079b7d8facf/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 387502
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012056