Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Vostroknutov Alexander 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: A Theory of Reciprocity with Incomplete Information
Abstract: A model of belief dependent preferences in finite multi-stage games with observable actions isproposed. It combines two dissimilar approaches: incomplete information (Levine, 1998) andintentionality (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Incompleteinformation is important because social preferences are not directly observable; intentions arefound to be indispensable in explaining behavior in games (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008). Inthe model it is assumed that the players have social attitudes that define their socialpreferences. In addition, players care differently about the payoffs of other players depending ontheir beliefs about their social attitude and possibly on the beliefs of higher orders. As thegame unfolds players update their beliefs about the types of other players. An action of a playershows intention when she chooses it anticipating future belief updating by others. A reasoningprocedure is proposed that allows players to understand how to update beliefs by constructing asequence of logical implications.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2012
Number: 015
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:7d50109f-809b-464c-a595-90137d9e5d7e/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 221127
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012015