Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Can Burak 
Author-Name: Storcken Ton 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Update Monotone Preference Rules
Abstract: Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus ona new condition: "update monotonicity" for preference rules. Although many so-called impossibilitytheorems for the choice rules are based on -or related to- monotonicity conditions, this appealingcondition is satisfied by several non-trivial preference rules. In fact, in case of pairwise,Pareto optimal, neutral, and consistent rules; the Kemeny-Young rule is singled out by thiscondition. In case of convex valued, Pareto optimal, neutral and replication invariant rules;strong update monotonicity implies that the rule equals the union of preferences which extend allpreference pairs unanimously agreed upon by k agents, where k is related to the number ofalternatives and agents. In both cases, it therewith provides a charaterization of these rules.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2011
Number: 048
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:59471039-a178-4960-9a2d-04d67b81924f/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 688470
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2011048