Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peters Hans 
Author-Name: Roy Souvik 
Author-Name: Storcken Ton 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences
Abstract: We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, y-strategy-proofness - meaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number y cannot manipulate - and unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 064
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:de9f32b8-8b06-49ae-931d-a3a3d0f120b1/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 353722
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010064