Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peeters Ronald 
Author-Name: Saran Rene 
Author-Name: Yuksel Ayse Muge 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Strategic Party Formation on a Circle
Abstract: We study a spatial model of party formation in which the set of agendas is the unit circle. We characterize the sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria under the plurality and proportional rules. In both rules, multiple configurations of parties are possible in Nash equilibrium. We refine our predictions using a new notion called “defection-proof” Nash equilibrium. Under the plurality rule, only those Nash equilibria in which either two or three parties exist are defection-proof, whereas multiple parties exist in any defectionproof Nash equilibrium under the proportional rule. These results are mostly consistent with the predictions of Duverger (1954).Keywords: Party Formation; Spatial Model; Plurality Rule; Proportional Rule; Nash Equilibrium; Defection-Proof Nash Equilibrium.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 045
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:73f6a973-1150-474a-9e65-55d3be940ed5/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 300700
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010045