Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Flesch János 
Author-Name: Kuipers Jeroen 
Author-Name: Mashiah-Yaakovi Ayala 
Author-Name: Schoenmakers Gijs 
Author-Name: Solan Eilon 
Author-Name: Vrieze Koos 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs
Abstract: We prove that every multi-player Borel game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 040
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:ed8288be-496a-435a-be3c-97c6259dfb2a/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 448208
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010040