Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Habis Helga 
Author-Name: Herings P. Jean-Jacques 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty
Abstract: We introduce the concept of a transferable utility game with uncertainty (TUU-game). In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature may materialize and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex. We study bankruptcy games with uncertainty and apply the Weak Sequential Core. We find that most of the best-known allocation rules are unstable in this setting, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 038
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:e8ef8102-2adf-4c6b-bf92-af71b1d0edc8/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 375067
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010038