Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Berger André 
Author-Name: Müller Rudolf 
Author-Name: Naeemi Seyed Hossein 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Path-Monotonicity and Incentive Compatibility
Abstract: We study the role of monotonicity in the characterization of incentive compatible allocation rules when types are multi-dimensional, the mechanism designer may use monetary transfers, and agents have quasi-linear preferences over outcomes and transfers. It is well-known that monotonicity of the allocation rule is necessary for incentive compatibility. Furthermore, if valuations for outcomes are either convex or differentiable functions in types, revenue equivalence literature tells that path-integrals of particular vector fields are path-independent. For the special case of linear valuations it is known that monotonicity plus path-independence is sufficient for implementation. We show by example that this is not true for convex or differentiable valuations, and introduce a stronger version of monotonicity, called path-monotonicity. We show that path-monotonicity and path-independence characterize implementable allocation rules if (1) valuations are convex and type spaces are convex; (2) valuations are differentiable and type spaces are path-connected. Next we analyze conditions under which monotonicity is equivalent to path-monotonicity. We show that an increasing difference property of valuations ensures this equivalence. Next, we show that for simply connected type spaces incentive compatibility of the allocation rule is equivalent to path-monotonicity plus incentive compatibility in some neighborhood of each type. This result is used to show that on simply connected type spaces incentive compatible allocation rules with a finite range are completely characterized by path--monotonicity, and thus by monotonicity in cases where path-monotonicity and monotonicity are equivalent. This generalizes a theorem by Saks and Yu to a wide range of settings.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 035
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:3589f728-18e8-49c9-9b27-279816a38b59/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 465329
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010035