Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Predtetchinski Arkadi 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: One-dimensional bargaining: a revision
Abstract: We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the unit interval. The acceptance or rejection of a proposal is determined by an acceptance rule represented by the collection of decisive coalitions. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies as the players become infinitely patient. We show that, along any sequence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria the social acceptance set collapses to a point. This point, called the limit of bargaining equilibria, is independent of the sequence of equilibria and is uniquely determined by the set of players, the utility functions, the recognition probabilities, and the acceptance rule. The central result of the paper is a characterization of the limit of bargaining equilibria as a unique zero of the characteristic equation. The characterization is used to study the comparative statics of the limit of bargaining equilibria with respect to the acceptance rule. 
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 031
File-URL: http://arnop.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19583
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 491589
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010031