Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Bos Iwan 
Author-Name: Peeters Ronald 
Author-Name: Pot Erik 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Do Antitrust Agencies Facilitate Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms?
Abstract: The theory of industrial collusion generally does not distinguish between tacit and explicit collusion. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms may still be willing and able to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in detecting and prosecuting cartels.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 030
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:b8bcba33-7e33-4dc7-839b-724e111f4c4e/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 321542
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010030