Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Grandjean Gilles Author-Name: Mauleon Ana Author-Name: Vannetelbosch Vincent Author-workplace-name: METEOR Title: Strongly Rational Sets for Normal-Form Games Abstract: Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player.s set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist and are compared with other well known solution concepts. We also provide a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set. Keywords: mathematical economics; Series: Research Memoranda Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 059 File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:0aaec778-2856-4cee-ba6d-5975ebb819f5/datastreams/ASSET1/content File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 395416 Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2009059