Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Grigorieva Elena 
Author-Name: Herings P. Jean-Jacques 
Author-Name: Müller Rudolf 
Author-Name: Vermeulen Dries 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations
Abstract: Query auctions are iterative auctions in which bidders have to select in each round an action from a finite set. We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of thebidders. Thus, when valuations are drawn from a continuous probability distribution, efficiency can only be bought at the expense of a running time that is infinite with probability one. For two bidders we even show this to be true when we only require efficiency with probability one.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2009
Number: 023
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:784f759d-f410-4229-a6b0-41f6e47eb6a6/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 241379
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2009023