Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peters Hans 
Author-Name: Roy Souvik 
Author-Name: Storcken Ton 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Manipulation under k-approval scoring rules
Abstract: Under a k-approval scoring rule each agent attaches a score of one to his k most preferred alternatives and zero to the other alternatives. The rule assigns the set of alternatives with maximal score. Agents may extend preferences to sets in several ways: they may compare the worst alternatives, or the best alternatives, or use a stochastic dominance criterion. In this paper we characterize the non-manipulable profiles for each of these set comparisons. For two-agent profiles we also determine the value(s) of k for which the number of non-manipulable profiles is maximal.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 056
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:e80f6958-ff7b-406d-9589-42383193a479/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 242172
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008056