Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dietrich, Franz 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified
Abstract: Condorcet''s famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of probability considered; (ii) none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justified. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 012
File-URL: http://arnop.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=11796
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 195748
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008012