Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Klaus Bettina 
Author-Name: Klijn Flip 
Author-Name: Walzl Markus 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets
Abstract: We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincideswith the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g.,for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have beenproposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core).An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the onlysolution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic withthe core.
Keywords: Economics (Jel: A)
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 010
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:d765c319-83c4-4c80-ac5a-d8f0aaa09e9a/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 349670
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008010