Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Storcken Ton 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains
Abstract: We study sets of preferences that are convex with respect to the betweeness relation induced by the Kemeny distance for preferences. It appears that these sets consist of all preferences containing a certain partial ordering and the other way around all preferences containing a given partial ordering form a convex set. Next we consider restricted domains where each agent has a convex set of preferences. Necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated under which a restricted domain admits unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial choice rules. Loosely speaking it boils down to admitting monotone and non-image-dictatorial decision rules on two alternatives where the other alternatives are completely disregarded.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 003
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:e06072fd-163b-4da6-af0c-7fa3feef451d/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 163328
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008003