Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Csóka Péter 
Author-Name: Herings P. Jean-Jacques 
Author-Name: Kóczy László Á 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Stable Allocations of Risk
Abstract: The measurement and the allocation of risk are fundamental problems of portfolio management. Coherent measures of risk provide an axiomatic approach to the former problem. In an environment given by a coherent measure of risk and the various portfolios’ realization vectors, risk allocation games aim at solving the second problem: How to distribute the diversification benefits of the various portfolios? Understanding these cooperative games helps us to find stable, efficient, and fair allocations of risk. We show that the class of risk allocation and totally balanced games coincide hence a stable allocation of risk is always possible. When the aggregate portfolio is riskless: risk is limited to subportfolios, the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of exact games. As in exact games any subcoalition may be subject to marginalization even in core allocations, our result further emphasizes the responsibility in allocating risk.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2007
Number: 040
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:d54781ed-dd83-407a-a284-fb0b5d9988d0/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 208332
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007040